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Bilingual Reading
Bankers had cashed in before the music stopped
According to standard narrative，the meltdown of Bear Stearns and Lehman Broth-ers largely wiped out the wealth of their top executives. Many - in the media，academia and the financial sector - have used this account to dismiss the view that pay structures caused excessive risk-taking and that reforming such structures is important. The narrative，however，turns out to be incorrect.
It is true that the top executives at both banks suffered significant losses on shares they held when their companies collapsed. But our analysis，using data from Securities and Exchange Commission filings，shows the banks’ top five executives had cashed out such large amounts since the beginning of this decade that，even after the losses，their net pay-offs during this period were substantially positive.
In 2000-07，the top five executives at Bear and Lehman pocketed cash bonuses exceeding $300m and $150m respectively (adjusted to 2009 dollars).Although the financial results on which bonus payments were based were sharply reversed in 2008，pay arrangements allowed executives to keep past bonuses.
Furthermore，executives regularly took large amounts of money off the table by unloading shares and options. Overall，in 2000-08 the top-five teams at Bear and Lehman cashed out close to $2bn in this way：about $1.1bn at Bear and $850m at Lehman. Indeed，the teams sold more shares during the years preceding the firms’ collapse than they held when the music stopped in 2008.
Altogether，equity sales and bonuses over that period provided the top five at the two banks with cash of about $1.4bn and $1bn respectively(an average of almost $250m each). These cash proceeds considerably exceed the value of the executives’ holdings at the beginning of 2000(which we estimate to be in the order of a respective $800m and $600m).
Of course，the executives would have made much more had the banks not blown up. By contrast to shareholders who stuck with the banks，however，the executives’total pay-offs during the period were decidedly in the black.
Our analysis undermines the claims that executives’ losses on shares during the collapses establish that they did not have incentives to take excessive risks. The fact that the executives did not sell all the shares they could prior to the meltdown does indicate that they did not anticipate collapse in the near future. But repeatedly cashing in large amounts of performance-based compensation based on short-term results did provide perverse incentives - incentives to improve short-term results even at the cost of an excessive rise in the risk of large losses at some (uncertain) point in the future.
To be sure，executives’ risk-taking might have been driven by a failure to recognise risks or by excessive optimism，and thus would have taken place even in the absence of these incentives. But given the structure of executive pay，the possibility that risk-taking was influenced by these incentives should be taken seriously.
The need to reform pay structures is not，as many have claimed，simply a politically convenient sideshow. Even if the type of incentives given to executives of Bear and Lehman - and others with similar pay structures - were not the cause of risk-taking in the past，they could be in future. Financial institutions，and the regulators overseeing them，should give the necessary priority to redesigning bonuses and equity-based compensation to avoid rewarding executives for short-term results that are subsequently reversed.
The stories of Lehman and Bear will undoubtedly remain in the annals of financial disaster for decades to come. To understand what has happened，and what lessons should be drawn，it is important to get the facts right. In contrast to what has been thus far largely assumed，the executives were richly rewarded for，not financially devastated by，their leadership of their banks during this decade.
譯文梗概
銀行業(yè)高管“殺鵝取蛋”
人們一般會(huì)這樣描述：貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)與雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)的垮臺(tái)，很大程度上抹去了其高管的財(cái)富。從傳媒界、學(xué)術(shù)界到金融業(yè)，許多人都用這個(gè)理由來反駁以下觀點(diǎn)：薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)過度冒險(xiǎn)，而改革這種結(jié)構(gòu)十分重要。然而，事實(shí)最終證明，這種說法是錯(cuò)誤的。
誠(chéng)然，當(dāng)這兩家銀行倒閉時(shí)，其高管所持的股票出現(xiàn)了巨額虧損。但我們的分析——使用美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)(Securities and Exchange Commission)文件中的數(shù)據(jù)——顯示，兩家銀行職位最高的5位高管自本世紀(jì)初以來一直在套現(xiàn)，即使扣除上述虧損，在此期間他們還是大有賺頭。
總體而言，在2000-2008年期間，貝爾斯登和雷曼的前五位高管團(tuán)隊(duì)，通過定期出售股票和兌現(xiàn)期權(quán)等方式套現(xiàn)將近20億美元：貝爾斯登大約為11億美元，雷曼大約為8.5億美元。事實(shí)上，這些高管在公司倒閉前幾年出售的股票，多于他們?cè)谌ツ陿非Ｖ箷r(shí)所持有的股票。
全部加起來，那段時(shí)期的售股與獎(jiǎng)金，讓兩家銀行的前五位高管分別收獲了約14億美元和10億美元的現(xiàn)金(平均每人將近2.5億美元)。這些現(xiàn)金收入遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過了這些高管在本世紀(jì)之初所持股票的價(jià)值(我們估計(jì)大約分別為8億美元和6億美元)。
高管們沒有在銀行倒閉前拋掉所有的股票，實(shí)際上表明他們沒有預(yù)計(jì)到銀行會(huì)在短期內(nèi)倒閉。
改革薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)的必要性并不像許多人所宣稱的那樣，只是一種處于政治需要的作秀。即便貝爾斯登與雷曼——以及其它有著類似薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)的機(jī)構(gòu)——高管所受到的那種激勵(lì)，并非以往(企業(yè))冒險(xiǎn)的原因，但以后也可能會(huì)是。金融機(jī)構(gòu)及其監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)賦予重新設(shè)計(jì)獎(jiǎng)金與基于股權(quán)的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)以必要的優(yōu)先性，以避免根據(jù)短期業(yè)績(jī)褒獎(jiǎng)高管——而這些業(yè)績(jī)隨后出現(xiàn)了逆轉(zhuǎn)。
無疑，未來數(shù)十年內(nèi)，雷曼和貝爾斯登的故事會(huì)一直留在金融災(zāi)難的編年史上。要想弄清楚發(fā)生了什么，以及我們應(yīng)從中汲取哪些教訓(xùn)，保證事實(shí)的真實(shí)性十分重要。與迄今為止許多人所猜想的相反，高管們由于自己這十年來的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)工作獲得了豐厚的酬勞，而并非蒙受了財(cái)務(wù)上的巨大損失。
�。ㄎ恼聛碓矗篎T中文網(wǎng)）
點(diǎn)評(píng):
wipe out在這里相當(dāng)于remove or cancel，即“除去、取消”的意思。
pocket在這里是動(dòng)詞，相當(dāng)于keep or take (something) for oneself，即“將某物據(jù)為己有”的意思。
這句話是虛擬語氣的句式，也可以寫成the executives would have made much more， if the banks had not blown up.
這句話是個(gè)復(fù)合句，主句部分是 Our analysis undermines the claims，claims后面的部分是that引導(dǎo)的同位語從句，在這個(gè)同位語從句中還包含一個(gè)that引導(dǎo)的賓語從句，作establish的賓語。establish在這里相當(dāng)于prove，是“證明”的意思。
這句話的主語部分是The fact that the executives did not sell all the shares they could prior to the meltdown ，that引導(dǎo)的是同位語從句，從句中的they could是定語從句，prior to 是before的意思。謂語是does indicate，does在這里起到強(qiáng)調(diào)的作用，可以翻譯為“確實(shí)、的確”。indicate后面是that引導(dǎo)的賓語從句。
even if引導(dǎo)的是讓步狀語從句，given to executives of Bear and Lehman and others with similar pay structures是incentives的后置定語。they could be in future是主句部分。 |